The Strategic Exploitation of Limited Information and Opportunity in Networked Markets by Ladley, Dan & Bullock, Seth
Comput Econ (2008) 32:295–315
DOI 10.1007/s10614-008-9140-8
The Strategic Exploitation of Limited Information
and Opportunity in Networked Markets
Dan Ladley · Seth Bullock
Accepted: 2 April 2008 / Published online: 24 April 2008
© Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 2008
Abstract This paper studies the effect of constraining interactions within a mar-
ket. A model is analysed in which boundedly rational agents trade with and gather
information from their neighbours within a trade network. It is demonstrated that a
trader’s ability to proﬁt and to identify the equilibrium price is positively correlated
with its degree of connectivity within the market. Where traders differ in their number
of potential trading partners, well-connected traders are found to beneﬁt from aggres-
sive trading behaviour. Where information propagation is constrained by the topology
of the trade network, connectedness affects the nature of the strategies employed.
Keywords Trade network · Agent-based computational economics · Information ·
Strategy
JEL Classiﬁcations D85 · D83 · D40
1 Introduction
Economics research has demonstrated the power of markets for allocating goods
amongst many individuals with heterogeneous allocations and beliefs. The majority
of this work has focused on markets in which all traders interact through a centralised
body or auctioneer, however, many are not organised in this manner. For instance,
D. Ladley (B )
Leeds University Business School, University of Leeds, Leeds LS2 9JT, UK
e-mail: danl@comp.leeds.ac.uk
S. Bullock
School of Electronics and Computer Science, University of Southampton, Southampton SO17 1BJ,
UK
e-mail: sgb@ecs.soton.ac.uk
123296 D. Ladley, S. Bullock
markets are frequently spatially distributed with each trader only interacting directly
with a small proportion of the other market participants. This paper investigates these
decentralised markets; it aims to examine the effect of limited trading opportunities
and information availability on the behaviour of individuals and of the market as a
whole. It will examine how a trader’s ability to make proﬁt is inﬂuenced by their
location within a trade network and how trader strategy must be adapted to cope with
this constraint.
The Walrasian auctioneer oversees the classic example of a centralised market;
informationiscomplete,therearenotransactioncostsanddecisionsaretakencentrally.
Such idealised markets are attractive for work in economics and related ﬁelds as they
combine many favourable elements including General Equilibrium through perfect
competition.Workusingthisapproachhasgeneratedmanypowerfulresultsregarding
the behaviour of markets and the traders within them, justifying its use and central
role. In certain circumstances, however, objections to the idealisations involved may
be raised.
The ﬁrst and most signiﬁcant is the issue of complexity (Scarf 1973). Work by
Papadimitriou (1994) has shown that calculating the Walrasian equilibrium is NP
complete. Hence, as the number of market participants or goods increases, the time
required for some central executive to complete the necessary computation increases
exponentially. Consequently, except for very specialised applications, the Walrasian
system is rarely observed empirically.
Instead,manymarketsoperateusingsystemsthattendtoapproximatetheWalrasian
equilibrium whilst avoiding the impractical computational costs. Double auctions and
the order book systems employed in many ﬁnancial markets do this by distributing
the computation of price and allocation of assets. These markets are highly efﬁcient
whilst also allowing traders to respond rapidly to changing information (Smith 1962).
Market efﬁciency may be further increased at the cost of speed of trade by the use of
batch auctions (Gode and Sunder 1997).
While distributed, the above market mechanisms are still centralised in that they
operate at a single location in which trade is conducted and through which all traders
communicate. This, however, does not have to be the case. It is possible for mar-
kets to be decentralised, i.e., for traders to communicate and trade with each other
through private, pairwise interactions. Axtell (2005) demonstrates the potential of this
type of market structure. He shows that a decentralised exchange can produce stable
allocations which are computationally much more desirable than Walrasian general
equilibrium but which are not in the core. In Axtell’s model although the market is
decentralisedintermsofitscomputationitisstillintegratedinthesensethatalltraders
may hypothetically interact and communicate with all others. Many real markets are
a step beyond this. They are frequently decentralised in terms of their computation
and segregated either in terms of trading opportunities (traders may only interact with
a subset of others within the market) or in terms of information (not all traders have
access to the same information).
Segregation in terms of trading opportunities may occur if traders only know about
a certain subset of the potential trading partners within the market, or will only
be willing to trade with a certain fraction of them. This may be dispositional, but
may also be due to the inherent nature of the interacting entities within the market.
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For instance, in labour markets referrals play an important role (Tassier and Menczer
inpress).Or,alternatively,transactioncostsmaymakeitimpracticalforcertaintraders
to interact. This is especially frequent when distance plays a role in the market (see,
e.g., Epstein and Axtell 1996, for a model in which trade is spatially constrained). As
a consequence a trader may limit themselves to trading with a subset of the market
and consequently risk not achieving the best possible interaction.
Markets may also be segregated in terms of information. Shoppers in retail markets
incur costs in terms of the time and effort required to visit multiple shops in order to
acquire information prior to trading. For this reason, a trader will frequently restrict
information gathering and trading to nearest neighbours or key operators in a market
and as a consequence may not execute the optimal trade.1 Even in markets where all
informationisfreelyavailablethecostsofanalysinginformationmaylimittheamount
of information that is actually considered, leading to different traders having different
information sets (Brock and Hommes 1997). For instance, traders within a ﬁnancial
markethavevirtuallyfreeaccesstoallmarketinformation.However,thesheervolume
of information within the market prevents traders from analysing it all. Consequently,
traderstend tospecialiseinasmall subsetof commodities for which they can studyall
of the available information. As a consequence, just like a retail shopper, each trader
only interacts with a limited subset of the market.
The segregation of markets and the resulting less-than-fully-integrated nature of
trader interactions allow heterogeneity’s to exist. There may be differences in terms
of who a trader can effectively trade with and in terms of the information each trader
can effectively gather and process. In many markets, traders may expend resources to
change their market situation, e.g., visit more shops or analyse more information. As
a consequence, the dynamics of these markets and the behaviour of the traders within
them are potentially very complex.
2 Previous Work
The behaviour and efﬁciency of decentralised markets is strongly affected by how
the traders are segregated (Wilhite 2001). Within models investigating these types of
markets it is important to be able to specify which traders can interact. Possibly the
most natural way to do this is to situate the market on a network. Traders may interact
with others to which they are connected and each trader is only connected to a subset
of all others. Evstigneev and Taksar (1995, 2002) provide results demonstrating the
existence of equilibria and the variation of equilibrium prices subject to changes in
trader behaviour within such a setting. Several papers demonstrate the importance of
the structure of the trading network in governing market behaviour (Evstigneev and
Taksar 1994; Falbo and Grassi 2004; Tassier and Menczer in press). The network
has been shown to affect the number of trades required in order to reach equilibrium
(Bell 1998), the amount of searching for trade partners that is required (Wilhite 2001)
and the results of negotiations between market participants (Markovsky etal. 1988;
1 Restricted information gathering differs from segregated trading opportunities. A trader may be prepared
to trade with many more traders than they are prepared to visit to acquire information.
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Lovaglia etal. 1995). Together these papers have shown that a non-centralised market
may converge to the theoretical optimum distribution of commodities, although the
speed at which this happens is highly inﬂuenced by the structure of the network
underlying the market. Networks with relatively high characteristic path lengths,2 for
instance lattices, converged much more slowly than those with short characteristic
path lengths, for instance small world networks. Small world networks, those with
few links but also low characteristic path length (Watts and Strogatz 1998), have the
addedbeneﬁtofrequiringrelativelylittleexpenditureonsearchingfortradingpartners
compared to more densely connected networks.
Theformationofthesenetworkshasreceivedsigniﬁcantattention.Keytothiswork
is the process of traders establishing mutually beneﬁcial relationships between each
other based on their own preferences. Over time these preferences lead to the forma-
tion of stable networks over which trade occurs. This process has been examined in
several settings, for example labour markets (Tesfatsion 2001), buyer seller relation-
ships (Kirman and Vriend 2001) and the emergence of money and shops (Howitt and
Clower 2000)( s e eVriend 2006,f o rar e v i e w ) .
This paper will focus on the effects of market segregation on market dynamics. We
aim to understand how boundedly rational traders cope with the limited information
set implied by a segregated market and how this affects their trading strategy and the
market’s ability to converge.3
The effect of market structure on the dissemination of information and how traders
make use of this information is of central concern. Previous studies have shown in a
relatively simple setting how better connected traders are able to exploit their greater
accesstotradingopportunitiestomakehigherproﬁtsbytradingwithmoreindividuals.
In contrast, in this paper we wish to examine the “market power” provided to a trader
by their position, i.e., how a trader is able to leverage their greater access to the market
to make the best possible trades. To this end we examine a model of trade in which
everytraderisabletobuyorsellasingleunitofacommoditywiththeaimofobtaining
as high return as possible.
In order to be able to understand how market segregation affects individual traders
it is necessary to employ a model that captures processes of information exchange and
learning at the level of individual traders. In several of the above-mentioned models,
pairs of traders on the network directly interrogate each others utility functions and
calculate an optimal allocation of goods. There is no role for information transfer or
strategy since both traders know exactly how each other values the commodity and
this valuation does not change throughout the lifetime of the market. This approach
is therefore inappropriate for investigating how individual trading behaviour might be
inﬂuenced by constraints on information ﬂow and trade. Instead we employ a model
in which each trader is allowed to learn individually using a learning rule.
2 A network’s characteristic path length is the mean of the shortest distances that separate all pairs of
network nodes.
3 By the term “segregated market” we mean a market that is less-than-fully integrated, i.e., one in which
not every trader is connected to every other trader. Here we will mostly be concerned with markets that,
while segregated in this sense, are not fragmented, i.e., are not composed of multiple isolated sub-markets.
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The trade networks investigated within this paper are ﬁxed. They do not change
during the duration of the experiment. As Wilhite states in relation to changes in
market topology “if this evolution is slow relative to economic activity taking place
on the network the characteristics of the network willhave a larger effect on economic
decisionsthanthosedecisionswillhaveuponthenetwork”(Wilhite2006).Inthiscase
we are focusing on a relatively short period during which the equilibrium price of the
market is identiﬁed and during which information is most signiﬁcant, consequently it
is justiﬁed to model a ﬁxed network in this case.
3 Model
We employ an agent-based model of trader interaction in which the actions of each
traderaregovernedbyindividualbehaviouralrules.Throughoutthesimulationtraders
react to, and may learn from, the market conditions they ﬁnd themselves in. Through
analysis of the success of the differing strategies we gain insight into the nature and
dynamics of trader behaviour in segregated markets.
3.1 Market Structure
In order to examine the effect of market segregation trader interactions were constrai-
ned by embedding the market on a network where traders occupied nodes and edges
represented bi-directional trade and/or communication channels. Many different net-
work conﬁgurations can be investigated, e.g., lattices, Erd˝ os-Rényi random graphs,
small worlds, etc.4 In this paper we concentrate on network structures resulting from
preferential attachment (Barabasi and Albert 1999), a process that grows networks
incrementally by tending to attach new nodes to existing well-connected nodes. The
graphs that result exhibit power-law degree distributions and positive assortedness
(Newman 2003). Such graphs are intuitively attractive as structures for markets as
they share many properties with real world social networks. Importantly, they contain
well connected network “hubs”, i.e., major players within the market who are well
connected to many other traders. Whereas such hubs tend not to be directly connected
within technological networks such as the Internet, power grids, etc., they do tend
to be directly connected within social networks (and those resulting from preferen-
tial attachment schemes) since inﬂuential individuals tend to inﬂuence one another
directly.
An existing preferential attachment scheme is employed here (Noble etal. 2004).
A network of N unconnected nodes is gradually populated with Ncedges. In random
order, each node is consulted, and allocated a bi-directional edge linking it to a second
node chosen according to probabilities calculated as bi ∝ (E(i) +  )E. Here, E is
the exponent of preferential attachment and remains constant, E(i) is node i’s current
degree (number of edges), and   is a small constant (0.1 for all results reported here)
that ensures unconnected nodes have a non-zero probability of gaining a neighbour.
4 Previouswork(Bell1998;Wilhite2001;FalboandGrassi2004)hasdemonstratedsomeoftheproperties
of markets set on these different structures.
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Self-connections and multiple connections between the same pair of nodes are not
allowed. All probabilities, bi, are updated after every edge is added. After c cycles
through the population, the network is complete. Note that every node will have a
minimum of c edges, and a maximum of N − 1.
Markets explored here have a relatively high preferential exponent of E = 1.0i n
ordertogeneratenetworksthatdisplayawiderangeofdegrees.Forallresultsreported
here, c = 10. Initial tests showed that if c was signiﬁcantly less than this value, the
market failed to converge as few traders were able to trade with their limited number
of neighbours. With signiﬁcantly more edges the behaviour of the market approaches
that of a completely connected centralised market.
3.2 Market Mechanism
The market mechanism for these experiments was chosen for its simplicity. It is sufﬁ-
cient to capture the essentials of information exchange and trade without introducing
additionalcomplexity.Eachsimulationisrunforaﬁxednumberofdiscretetimesteps.
At the start of a simulation every trader within the market is issued, at random, with
eitheroneunitofanindivisiblenamelesscommoditytosellortherighttobuyoneunit
of the nameless commodity. Each of these traders is also issued an integer reservation
price, chosen with uniform probability from the integer distribution [Pmin, Pmax].F o r
buyers, this reservation price is the maximum value that they can pay for a unit of
the commodity. For sellers, it is the minimum value they can accept for their unit of
the commodity. At each step, a trader who has yet to trade is selected at random to
make a shout. The other traders to which the shouter is connected in the trade network
are then polled in random order for responses to the shout. The market mechanism
operates on a simple “take it or leave it” basis. If the value of the shout is acceptable to
a listener then a trade is executed at the shouted price, if not the next agent is polled.
If no trader accepts the shout then no trade is made.
3.3 Trader Behaviour
The traders employed within these experiments employ the “ZIP” learning rule
governing their price-determining behaviour (Cliff and Bruten 1997). This learning
rule allows the traders to learn from the information present within the market and
make informed trade decisions whilst also being simple, thus avoiding unnecessary
complexity.
The ZIP learning rule attempts to maximise the amount of proﬁt made by the trader
based on information it hears from other market participants. Each trader maintains a
proﬁtmargin,m boundedtoliein[0,1],associatedwithitsﬁxedreservationprice.For
buyers, this determines the amount by which they wish to undercut their reservation
price when they trade. For sellers, it determines the amount by which they wish to
exceed their reservation price. The trader’s valuation of the commodity is p.T h i si s
the value they shout if requested and the least favourable price they will accept from
another trader to trade at. It is deﬁned as p = λ − m(pmax − pmin) for buyers and
p = λ + m(pmax − pmin) for sellers, where λ is a trader’s reservation price.
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Each time a trader within the market makes a shout, connected traders adapt their
proﬁt margin in the following manner. If the trader is a buyer and they hear a shout at
price q which is accepted and if p ≥ q (a trader successfully trades the commodity at
a lower price) the buyer raises their proﬁt margin (decreases their price). If the shout
wasanofferand p ≤ q (asellerofferedthecommodityatahigherpricethanthebuyer
valued it) the buyer lowers their proﬁt margin (increases their price). If the last shout
was a bid which was not accepted then if p ≤ q (a trader bid more than the buyers
valuation and it was not accepted) the buyer lowers their proﬁt margin (increases their
price). These rules are deﬁned analogously for sellers.
Traders adjust their proﬁt margin, m, using the Widrow–Hoff learning rule with
momentum (Widrow and Hoff 1960). The traders the learning rule is deﬁned at time
t as
m(t + 1) = (p(t) + F(t))/(λ − 1)
Here p(t) is the trader’s valuation as deﬁned above and F(t) is deﬁned as
F(t + 1) = γ F(t) + (1 − γ)δ(t)
where
δ(t) = β(τ(t) − p(t))
γ is the momentum term and τ(t) is the target or desired output price and is calculated
as
τ(t) = R(t)q(t) + A(t)
Here R(t)isasmallrelativeperturbationdrawnfromauniformdistribution[1.0,1.05]
for buyers and [0.95,1.0] for sellers, A(t) is a small absolute perturbation drawn from
a uniform distribution [0.0,0.05] for buyers and [−0.05,0.0] for sellers, and q(t) is
the shouted price.
3.4 Parameter Optimisation
Each traders parameter values are tailored to its position within a network. The initial
behaviour of a trader using the ZIP learning rule is governed by three real-valued
parameters,learningrate,momentumandinitialproﬁtmargin,whichmaybeexpressed
asavectorV: V =[ β,γ,m].WhileCliff(2003)employsamoresophisticatedgenetic
algorithm to search the strategy space, this model signiﬁcantly simpliﬁes the trader
strategy space allowing investigation with a simpler hill-climbing search algorithm.
In order to allow parameter values to adapt to different degrees of trader connec-
tedness, separate populations were maintained for each location within the market.
For a market of N traders, N populations of size four were maintained. Members
of the ﬁrst population were assessed in the most well-connected market location
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(i.e., the network node with highest degree), while members of the Nth population
were always assessed in the least well-connected market location (i.e., the network
node with lowest degree). In general, each of the N populations was associated with
a speciﬁc rank of network node degree.
In each trial a market network was generated as described in the previous section,
and one member of each population was chosen at random and added to the network
in the appropriate place. Every member of each population participated in 20 trials
eachgeneration.Duetotherandomallocationofreservationpricesitwasnecessaryto
assesstraderstrategyﬁtnessmultipletimesinordertoobtainameaningfulestimation.
Strategy ﬁtness was calculated as the average proﬁt extracted by a strategy over all
trials in that generation. After each set of trials the ﬁttest individual in each population
was selected to be copied into the next generation. The remaining three places in each
population were then ﬁlled by taking this ﬁttest individual and mutating each of its
three parameters to produce three new strategies each differing from the original in
oneparameter. Mutationconsistedofperturbingoneparameter byavaluedrawnfrom
a uniform distribution (−0.05,0.05). If the mutated value was greater than one or less
than zero then the mutation was discarded and the original value used.
4 Results
Experimentswereperformedusingmarketspopulatedby100traders.Eachtraderwas
randomly allocated a reservation price in the range [0,100] (pmin = 0 and pmax =
100), and either the ability to buy one unit or sell one unit of an unnamed indivisible
commodity. Each market simulation lasted for 400 time steps. During each simulation
run, both trade and information ﬂow were constrained by a network constructed as
described above with E = 1.0 and c = 10. Selection occurred over 1,000 generations
with 100 populations each of size 4. We contrast these result with those obtained
under the same conditions for a market in which trade and information ﬂow are not
constrained.
Figure1showstheaverageproﬁt(ﬁtness)ofeachpopulationintheﬁnalgeneration,
ranked in order of decreasing connectivity. As expected, all traders within the fully
connected market make approximately the same amount of proﬁt. By contrast, this is
not the case in the segregated market. In line with the results of Wilhite (2001), the
betterconnectedtradersmakesigniﬁcantlymoreproﬁt.Thesegregatedmarketsarefar
more sparsely connected than a fully connected market, with their better-connected
traders having at most the same number of connections as every trader within the
fully connected market. However, since these traders are relatively well-connected
compared to their competitors, they are able to leverage their market position to ﬁnd
better trading opportunities and so make more advantageous trades.
Figure2 demonstrates that, over time, traders’ valuations approach the equilibrium
price (as calculated from the reservation prices of the traders), regardless of their
connectivity.Thetradersdonotallconvergeatthesamerate,however.Thosewithmost
connections converge fastest. Traders who are better connected receive information
morefrequentlyandsohaveabetterimpressionofthestateofthemarketandarebetter
able to accurately judge the equilibrium price. Consequently the better connected
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Fig. 1 Proﬁt obtained by traders in a segregated market (traders ordered by decreasing connectivity) and
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Fig. 2 Absolute deviation from equilibrium price over the lifetime of a market, averaged over 10,000
markets,forpopulationsoftradersrankedinorderofdecreasingconnectivity(i.e.,theﬁrstrankcorresponds
to the population of strategies optimised to occupy the highest degree node in the trade network; the
hundredth rank corresponds to the population optimised to occupy the lowest degree node in the trade
network)
traders are able to make larger proﬁts at the start of the simulation by exploiting their
greaternumberofconnectionsandmoreaccuratevaluationofthecommodity.Astime
progresses all traders converge towards the equilibrium price and the initial advantage
of the better connected traders in making larger proﬁts is reduced.
Importantly, the ﬁnal deviation from the equilibrium price is not zero. There are
several reasons for this. Firstly, traders are allocated units which are untradable at the
equilibrium price on approximately 50% of occasions, i.e., half of the buy reservation
pricesarebelowequilibriumandhalfofthesellpricesareabove.Consequentlytraders
issuedwiththesepriceswillneverachievetheequilibriumprice.Whentradeissegrega-
tedbyatradenetworkthissituationisexacerbated.Sometraderswillbeunabletotrade
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despitethepresence ofwillingpartnersinthemarketasawhole, becausethey willnot
haveaneighbourpreparedtotradewiththem.Asaresult,assumingalltradersconverge
towards the equilibrium price up to the point at which they expect to make no proﬁt,
the half of the traders with tradable units will have a deviation of zero while the remai-
ning half will have a deviation of 1
2(pmax − (pmax + pmin)/2) = 1
2(100 − 50) = 25,
and so the average deviation across both groups of traders is (0 + 25)/2. Subject to
the above assumption 12.5 points of the deviation is due to this effect and should be
considered the baseline. The remainder of the deviation is due to traders trading early
and no longer modifying their valuation and the informational constraints of the mar-
ket, i.e., if all of a trader’s neighbours have traded or if the trader only has neighbours
whoareunabletoreachtheequilibriumpricetheymayreceiveinaccurateinformation
resulting in them being unable to identify the equilibrium price.
5 Distinguishing Trade from Information Flow
In order to understand the effect of the network on trade and the importance of infor-
mation ﬂow in a segregated market, the effects of trade and information ﬂow across
a market were separated. Four scenarios were investigated and compared: (i) fully-
connected trade network with fully-connected information network; (ii) segregated
trade network with fully-connected information network; (iii) fully-connected trade
network with segregated information network; and (iv) trade and information ﬂow
segregated by the same network. In cases where a network is described as fully-
connected all traders are connected to all others and the speciﬁed type(s) of interac-
tion can occur between all pairs of individuals—the market is effectively centralised.
In the cases where the market is described as segregated, a network is generated via
preferential attachment as described above and the speciﬁed type(s) of interaction can
only occur between traders that are network neighbours.
The ﬁrst case, both aspects completely connected, is the equivalent of a small,
centralised market where all traders can communicate and trade with each other and
theamountofinformationissufﬁcientlysmallthatalltraderscanprocessiteffectively.
This case also serves as the baseline case against which the others may be compared.
The second case is similar to some ﬁnancial markets where it is possible to gather all
of the information about all trades that occur, yet it is only possible to trade with some
of the traders present. For instance, an individual investor may only be able to trade
with a small subset of brokers who are willing to deal with small customers. The third
casehassomesimilaritieswiththefootballtransfermarket.Theoreticallyanyclubcan
deal with any other yet the details of trades between other clubs may not be known.
Thefourthcaseissimilartoaspatiallyembeddedmarketsuchasaretailmarketwhere
every trader can only communicate and trade with a subset of the other traders within
the market. In the case of a retail market this restriction is due to geography and the
size of the market. The details of the effects of the information and trade networks are
described in the next two sections.
Figure3 shows the average ﬁtness of individuals in the ﬁnal generation averaged
over 100 experimental runs. The effect of both the information and trade networks
may be clearly seen. The presence or absence of the trade network has a clear and
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Fig.3 Averageﬁtnessoftradersintheﬁnalgenerationaveragedover100runsforvariousmarketconditions
intuitive effect on trader ﬁtness. When trade is constrained to take place across the
network,thosetraderswhoarebestconnected aresubstantiallyﬁtter.Thisisprimarily
because the more connections a trader has the more likely they are to be able to ﬁnd
a suitable trade partner with which to make an advantageous trade.
It can be seen that constraining information leads to an increase in ﬁtness for those
less well connected individuals and a decrease in ﬁtness for the most well connected
individuals. It is easiest to understand this result when considered together with those
for the momentum and learning terms which control traders’ reactions to informa-
tion. The learning rate and momentum terms associated with the trading strategies are
shown in Figs.4 and 5. It can be seen that when information ﬂow is unconstrained,
whether or not trade is constrained, both the learning rate and momentum terms are
approximately constant across the optimised populations. In contrast, when informa-
tion ﬂow is restricted by the network there are obvious trends: momentum values
are negatively correlated with trader connectivity, while learning rate values become
positively correlated with connectivity. In both cases, these correlations are stronger
when trade is unconstrained.
The learning rate and momentum parameters control the learning process of each
individual trader. When information ﬂow is unconstrained and consequently all
individuals receive the same information it is perhaps not unexpected that all traders
deal with this situation in the same way. Understanding the reason for the correlati-
ons between learning parameters and connectivity when information is constrained
is slightly more complex. First, it is important to remember that the “accuracy” of
information changes throughout the life of the market. As was shown in Fig.2, initi-
ally valuations and therefore shouted prices are far from the equilibrium valuation.
However, this situation changes rapidly as valuations quickly become more accurate.
By deﬁnition, when information ﬂow is constrained by a network, those traders who
are better connected receive more information than those who are less connected.
Well-connected traders initially receive large amounts of information the content of
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Fig. 4 Learning rates of traders in the ﬁnal generation of each of 100 populations averaged over 100 runs
for four market conditions. Populations are ordered from most to least connected
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Fig. 5 Momentum values of traders in the ﬁnal generation of each of 100 generations averaged over 100
runs for four market conditions. Populations are ordered from most to least connected
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which is rapidly changing. Therefore, it is important that these traders are able to
respond and quickly adapt to this changing content in order to allow them to beneﬁt
from advantageous prices and avoid being seduced by poor trades due to out of date
information. Consequently these traders require a high learning rate to allow them
to keep abreast of the market situation and be well suited to it at all points in time.
In markets where information is unconstrained, all traders are forced to have high
learning rates to respond to this rapid inﬂux of information. Similarly these traders
have a low momentum so that they focus on the most recent information and pay less
attention to events in the past as the market state may have changed.
Less well connected traders receive information more slowly and consequently
are able to adopt a different strategy. Rather than trying to keep abreast of every
market action they instead attempt to gain a picture of the market by aggregating
information over time. Because these traders receive information less frequently and
adopt a relatively low learning rate, they are able to weather much of the initial period
of high volatility in the market. The relatively high momentum value allows them to
gain an accurate picture of the competitive price by averaging over the more stable
midandlate-marketpriceswhilstallowingthetradertoignoremisleadingshouts.This
strategyissuccessfulasevidencedbyFig.3.Whentradeisunconstrained,anymistakes
in valuation are penalised quickly due to all traders having more potential partners.
In order to compensate for this more radical strategies are adopted resulting in the
increased trend in the learning and momentum parameters. Segregating information
ﬂow confers a relative advantage on less well connected traders (note that this is
only a relative advantage as there is only a ﬁxed amount of proﬁt available within
the market and so an increase in proﬁt for one group necessitates a decrease in proﬁt
for another). This rather counter intuitive result indicates that without the ability to
exploit a greater number of connections in order to make more trades, the challenge of
processingagreatervolumeofpossiblymisleadinginformationmaymakeitpreferable
to concentrate on fewer information sources.
Figure6 shows the average initial margin of traders in the experiments. It can be
seen from these graphs that when trade is constrained by the network, well-connected
traders tend to have a higher initial margin than the less well-connected traders. This
means that at the start of each experiment traders in such markets ﬁnd it advantageous
to ask a relatively high price for their commodity. Figure3 indicates that they achieve
increased proﬁts from this strategy. In effect a good market position allows traders to
adopt more aggressive market strategies. The presence or absence of the information
network affects all traders equally. When information is constrained traders have a
higher initial margin. This is because information takes longer to propagate within
the market and so it takes longer for a trader to arrive at an accurate valuation of the
commodity. As a result, traders initially demand more in order to offset the risk of,
and avoid prematurely entering, a disadvantageous trade.
6 Exploiting Neighbourhood Information
Itcanbeseenfromtheprevioussectionthatboththeinformationnetworkandtradenet-
workprovideadvantagestothosewhocanexploitknowledgeoftheirownconnectivity.
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Fig. 6 Initial proﬁt margins of traders in the ﬁnal generation of each of 100 populations averaged over 100
runs for various market conditions. Populations are ordered from most to least connected
However, until now traders have made no distinction between the information they
receive from different neighbours. Here, by modifying the standard learning rule, we
allow traders to act based upon both their position within the network(s) and that of
their neighbours.
There are at least two ways in which traders might distinguish between different
kindsofneighbour.Atradermightdecidetopaymoreattentiontoinformationgleaned
from certain neighbours (perhaps the more well connected ones). Alternatively better
connected traders may attempt to exploit their connectivity advantage by demanding
more favourable prices from less well connected traders who have less choice.
In order for traders to vary their strategy based on the connectivity of their neigh-
bours the function g(s,r) was deﬁned, where s and r are the sender and recipient of
a shout:
g(s,r) =
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩
log E(s)
E(r)
log(Rmax)
: E(s) ≥ E(r)
−
log E(r)
E(s)
log(Rmax)
: E(s)<E(r)
The function, E(), gives the number of neighbours (degree) of a trader, and Rmax
is the largest ratio of edges between two adjacent traders within the market.
In order for traders to adapt the weight they place on information from different
sources the Widrow–Hoff learning rule was modiﬁed so that the learning rate β was
dependant on trader connectivity.
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δ(t) =
 
(β + α(1 − β)g(s,r))(τ(t) − p(t)) : E(s) ≥ E(r)
(β + αβg(s,r))(τ(t) − p(t)) : E(s)<E(r)
Within this function, the parameter α allows control of how much importance the
trading strategy places on the topological rule. If α is set equal to zero the topological
information is ignored and the unmodiﬁed learning rule is employed. α may range
from −1 to 1. Negative values weight information from less well connected traders
more heavily, positive values do the converse. The terms β and (1−β)directly before
the function g(s,r) scales the changes in the learning rule so that the learning rate
remains in the range [0,1].
Traders may also adapt the proﬁt margin they demand from other traders.5 For
standard traders, the price p at which the trader values the asset is deﬁned as p =
λ − m(pmax − pmin) for buyers and p = λ + m(pmax − pmin) for sellers, where λ is
the trader’s reservation price.
We modify this situation with the introduction of a parameter, θ, and the function
g(s,r), where s and r are the sender and recipient of a shout.
For buyers:
p = λ − m(1 + θg(s,r))(pmax − pmin)
For sellers:
p = λ + m(1 + θg(s,r))(pmax − pmin)
Likeα,θ isallowedtovarybetween−1and1,wherenegativevaluesleadtohigher
margins being demanded from less well connected traders and positive values lead to
higher margins being demanded from better connected traders, a value of zero leads
to the rule having no effect.
6.1 Results
We wish to compare the effect of these two rules on the behaviour of traders. First,
doesthepossessionofeitherruleconferanadvantageonasingletraderlocatedwithin
a market populated by standard ZIP traders? Answering such a question requires care
sinceatraderwithvariablelearningrate,say,mightenjoyanadvantageinsuchamarket
merely by virtue of achieving a learning rate that is high with respect to all individuals
within the market. Such an advantage would have been achieved without exploiting
any topological information about the trader’s neighbours. In order to control for this
potential artifact, initially we compare the performance of the two topological rules in
a rather artiﬁcial market constructed such that the modiﬁed trader being assessed has
learningratesandmarginsthatareguaranteed,onaverage,toequalthoseofunmodiﬁed
5 In order to preserve market structure it is not used when traders are making a shout as shouts are made
publicly to all of the traders neighbours (potentially of different connectivities) and therefore must be of
one value.
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traders. Here we report the market structure without comment. See Appendix A for a
full account.
Two equal-sized groups of 51 standard traders are constructed. The ﬁrst group
form a fully connected clique (i.e., each trader has 50 neighbours). The second group
formsaminimallyconnected ring(i.e.,eachtraderhastwoneighbours).Themodiﬁed
trader possessing one of the two topological learning rules is added to the market by
assigning ﬁve connections to random agents within each of the two groups (i.e., the
trader has degree 10). Like any other trader, this agent adapts its valuation based on
the information it hears and will accept favourable offers, but it will never make any
shouts. In this way, we can measure the traders proﬁt and its ability to estimate the
market’s equilibrium price.
In each of 10,000 market runs, traders were initialised with a random proﬁt margin
drawn from a uniform distribution [0.2,0.8], a learning rate of 0.5a sd i s c u s s e di n
AppendixA,arandommomentumvaluedrawnfromauniformdistribution[0.2,0.8].
Theseparameterswerechosentoallowthetradersawiderangeofpossiblebehaviours
and are based on those used in previous studies (Cliff and Bruten 1997).6
Experiments on a range of values of α show that for positive values of the weigh-
ting factor traders make more proﬁt than those not using topological information.
By weighting information from the better connected traders more highly than that
received from less well connected traders the monitored trader is able to make higher
proﬁts. The reason for this is shown in Fig.7. As can be seen, the valuation of a trader
using the modiﬁed topological learning rule converges faster and to a signiﬁcantly
lower asymptotic value than the trader using the standard rule (t-test, p < 0.0001).
Hence, the topological learning rule has a positive effect on traders’ understanding of
the market conditions and hence their valuation of the asset.7 This result is promising,
since it indicates that weighting information according to its source may increase a
trader’s ability to identify the correct value of the commodity and make increased
proﬁts.
Similarly, a complementary set of experiments demonstrate that for small negative
values (−0.5 ≤ θ ≤ 0) of the weighting parameter θ the margin weighting rule leads
to increased proﬁts over a trader not using the rule. The increased performance is
achieved for negative values of the weighting parameter, indicating that the trader
ﬁnds it beneﬁcial to charge higher prices to traders with less connections, in effect
exploiting their weak position in the market.
Wenow extend thisexamination toconsider trade across morerealisticpreferential
attachment networks. Figure8 illustrates selected traders in markets composed of (i)
naive traders (i.e., those with randomised parameter values drawn from the standard
distributions) and (ii) those in which the traders’ parameters were optimised. Figures
report the difference between the performance of a standard trader and a trader in
6 Note that the previously optimised parameters were inappropriate as they were not optimised for this
market setup.
7 The deviation from the equilibrium price can be seen to increase slightly after it reaches its minimum.
The reason for this is that towards the end of the experiment the traders with the reservation prices that
allowtradehavetradedleavingonlythosewhohaveworseprices.Consequentlytheinformationfromthese
traders is less informative leading to an increase in deviation from the equilibrium price.
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Fig. 7 Absolute deviation from equilibrium price averaged over 10,000 runs for the monitored traders in
markets designed to control for learning rate, for the topological learning rule, α = 0.5
Learning Rule Margin Rule Learning Rule Margin Rule
0.95
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1
1.01
1.02
1.03
1.04
1.05
F
i
t
n
e
s
s
 
R
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
t
o
 
U
n
m
o
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
T
r
a
d
e
r
s Most Connected
Least Connected
Niave Traders Evolved Traders
Fig. 8 Fitness of traders employing the learning or margin rules relative to those not employing them.
Fitness calculated from 10,000 repetitions of each condition: best connected ﬁtness averaged over 10 best
connected individuals in each market, least connected ﬁtness averaged over ﬁtness of 10 least connected
individuals in each market. For learning rule, α = 0.5; for margin rule θ =− 0.5
the same market location with the ability to adapt either their learning rate or their
proﬁt margin based on market topology information.
From Fig.8 it can be seen that when pitted against naive trader behaviour the use of
boththemarginandlearningrateadaptationrulesleadtoincreasedproﬁtsforadaptive
traders of either high or low connectivity. In the case of learning rate adaptation, less
well connected traders are able to gain better information about the market and so
make more proﬁt. When margin adaptation is employed, better connected traders are
abletoexploittheirlargernumberofconnectionsmoreeffectivelytomakemoreproﬁt.
However,Fig.8alsoshowsthatwhenalltradersinthemarketarepermittedtoadapt
their parameters to their market location, including whether and how they employ
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the adaptive rule being examined, the adaptive rule confers very little advantage. In
fact, the optimised values of θ and α are all very close to zero indicating that the rules
were not used. This indicates that a trader can exploit knowledge of the relationship
between a neighbour’s connectivity and their own only if that neighbour is not able to
make strategic use of the same information, i.e., the inherent advantage due to market
location that was demonstrated in Fig.3 can neither be exaggerated nor attenuated by
attending to topology in order to set learning rates or margins.
TheexplanationforthisishintedatbyFig.2.Well-connectedtradersinitiallyenjoy
a more accurate estimate of the market price, but this advantage diminishes over the
course of the market. If poorly-connected traders are prepared to trade early, they
risk being exploited by their better-connected and better-informed neighbours. By
evolving strategies that tend to prevent early trades, poorly-connected traders protect
themselves against the volatility in the early period of trading. After this period, all
traderswillhavetendedtoacquirethesameaccurateestimationofmarketprice.Since
both topological learning rules rely on exploiting disparity between well-connected
and poorly-connected traders, their utility tends to be extinguished by the cautious
optimised trading strategies of less well-connected traders.
7 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the effect of market structure on market behaviour and
trader strategies. We have demonstrated that the assumption that markets are homo-
geneous and centralised has a signiﬁcant effect on market behaviour. We can see that
when this assumption is relaxed by imposing a network structure on the market, a
traders position within the market has a noticeable effect on their performance and
strategy. Traders who are “centrally located” within the market have a clear advantage
over more peripheral traders due to their many trading opportunities. However, they
do have to integrate large quantities of potentially inaccurate and misleading infor-
mation from neighbouring traders in order to gain an accurate picture of the market.
This problem is acute. When all traders are free to trade with one another, but some
traders are better connected in terms of access to market information, such traders
are actually disadvantaged. This result shows clearly that market structure can be im-
portant and that assumptions regarding market behaviour derived from completely
connected centralised markets do not necessarily hold in distributed settings.
When traders are given the chance to tailor their strategy to their position within
the market, we see that it is advantageous for traders to adopt strategies based on
their connectivity. For instance, better connected traders tend to be more aggressive
and reactionary, while less connected traders tend to be more cautious. The simple
topological learning rules for learning rate and proﬁt margin presented in this paper
demonstrated that traders are able to make use of market structure information to
positively affect their performance in markets composed of naive traders. However, it
was also shown that when traders strategies are tailored to their market location, no
tradermaygainanybeneﬁtfromtheserules.Aswithmanyevolutionaryscenarios,the
environment in which a trader operates, i.e., the collection of other trading strategies
in the market, has a clear impact on strategy choice.
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This paper investigated the effect of one market structure on trader strategy. There
are potentially many alternative market structures that could be investigated. In this
caseweexaminedmarketsformedthroughapreferentialattachmentscheme,however,
there are many alternatives with different local or global structures which should be
considered.Forinstancethegraphgenerationalgorithmweconsidereddoesnotencou-
rage clustering as found in social networks. Traders engaging in tripartite negotiations
are likely to behave in different ways to those only dealing with bipartite interactions,
though in this case the relatively simple traders presented in this paper do not have
the capacity to exploit this knowledge. Moreover, here the market structure was ﬁxed.
This is rarely the case in reality, where market structure changes over time as traders
generate new relationships and end old ones based on their value and proﬁtability. By
allowing the networks to be formed endogenously there is scope for further investiga-
tingtherelationshipbetweenindividualstrategy,networkformationandlearning.The
market model employed here was relatively simple and focused on the initial period
of the market’s operation until it reaches equilibrium. In particular, every trader only
had a single unit of the commodity to buy or sell. The next step is to combine this
work with models such as that of Wilhite (2001) to examine the interaction of vo-
lume effects and the market power effects. By allowing traders to trade multiple times
we expect the advantage of better connected traders to be enhanced as they use their
manyconnectionstogainadditionalbeneﬁt.Inthescenariosexploredhere,favourable
market position confers an advantage in terms of ability to ﬁnd a proﬁtable trade but
not in terms of quantities of trades. There is also the possibility of investigating the
optimality of strategy in a more general framework. The use of genetic programming
may be one possible method for this. Lensberg and Schenk-Hoppé (2007) point the
way with a paper in which theoretically optimal investment strategies for multiple
ﬁnancial assets are evolved.
Appendix A
Here we explain how to construct a market topology with which to control for the
learning rate or margin of a trader employing a topological learning rule. In the case
of the standard traders, the learning rate β = 0.5. When the topological learning
rule is employed, it is possible to specify the degree of each of the neighbours of
the monitored trader such that its average learning rate, ¯ βn is also equal to, e.g., 0.5.
Given that the learning rates of traders using the topological learning rule lies within
the range [0.0,1.0], that the monitored trader has an equal number of neighbours in
each of two groups of standard traders, and that within each group all traders share
the same connectivity, we can write an expression for ¯ βn.
¯ βn =
1
2
⎛
⎝(1 − β)+
β log
 
Emax
E(n)
 
log(Rmax)
+ β −
β log
 
E(n)
Emin
 
log(Rmax)
⎞
⎠
Here Emax is the connectivity of standard traders in the fully connected group,
Emin is the connectivity of standard traders in the weakly connected ring, and E(n) is
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the number of connections to the monitored trader. For β = 0.5 this equation can be
rewritten:
n =
 
EmaxEmin
The above approach may be applied, mutatis mutandis, for the margin parameter.
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